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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

S. C. KELSEY and DA YID E.
SORENSEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
C. PHIL HANSEN and
BOB BOYER,

t
\/

Case No.
10568

Defendants-llcupundnu'.\. !

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant brought an action on a written contract
against Respondent and one C. Phil Hansen, alleging
that Respondent had, by the agreement, undertaken
to assume certain obligations and in failing to pay
them had damaged the Appellant.
I

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried before the Court. At the close
of Appellant's case Respondent moved to dismiss as
to Respondent. The Court took this motion under advisement until Respondent had produced his evidence
and rested. The matter was again taken under advisement and thereafter the Court granted Respondent's
motion and entered an order dismissing Appellant's
Complaint.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, as seller, on September 23, 1963, entered
into an Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 1-P) with
Respondent and one C. Phil Hansen as buyers. The
Agreement called for the exchange of certain real properties. As part of this Agreement, Respondent and
Mr. Hansen agreed to assume the cost of certain extras
relating to Appellant's property.
This Earnest Money Agreement states, at line 27,
that the instruments of conveyance would be made in
names "to be arranged." Since the transaction was an
exchange, this phrase applied to the documents of
conveyance from both parties. Respondent testified he
informed Appellant before the exchange deeds were
executed and after the Earnest Money Agreement was
signed that Mr. Hansen would be the sole purchaser
of the property. (Tr. 44-45).
2

At the closing Appellant was presented a deed
for his signature conveying his property only to Mr.
Hansen. (Ex. P-2). On the same date, October 1, 1963,
there was executed an Assignment of Contract (Ex.
D-3) covering the Hansen property and signed by C.
Phil Hansen alone and listing Appellant and his wife
as assignees. Later, on January 14, 1964, a Quitclaim
Deed conveying the Hansen property to Appellant
and his wife was signed by Mr. Hansen and delivered
to Appellant. (Ex. D-4).
The final documents of transfer between Appellant
and Mr. Hansen were not prepared by Respondent
nor were they prepared with his knowledge (Tr. 4041) and Respondent did not communicate with Appellant to ask him to come to close the transaction (Tr.
41) nor was he present at said closing. (Tr. 41). In
fact, from the time Appellant was informed of Mr.
Hansen's sole interest in the exchange, the transaction
was entirely handled by :Mr. Hansen (Tr. 44). From
the date of the Earnest Money Agreement, neither
Respondent's name nor signature appear on any document relating to this transaction.
'Vhen Mr. Hansen subsequently defaulted on the
payments under this assumed obligation, Appellant
called Respondent four or five times about the delinquency and was told each time by Respondent that he
would refer the matter to Mr. Hansen (Tr. 41-2)
which was done. (Tr. 42).

3

ARGUMENT
The Respondt:nt, while initially agreeing, as a
signer of the Earnest Money Agreement, to participate
in the assumption of the obligations here at issue, was
not a recipient of the property which formed the consideration for such assumption. Such assumption and
the supporting conveyance were integral parts of the
single transaction, in which Respondent ultimately had
neither interest nor responsibility.
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No. 1. THE DEBT-ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT WAS NOT A COLLATERAL AGREEMENT WHICH SURVIVED THE EXECUTION OF THE EXCHANGE DEEDS.
No. 2. THE EARNEST l\'lONEY AGREEMENT WAS, BY ITS OWN TERMS, ABROGATED BY THE EXECUTION OF THE EX- ,
CHANGE DEEDS.
No. 3. IF THE DEBT - A S S UMP T I 0 N
AGREEMENT DID SlTRVIVE THE EXECUTION OF THE EXCHANGE DEEDS, IT DID
SO ONLY AS TO THE VENDEE OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY.
No. 4. EVEN SHOULD THE DEBT-ASSUMPTION PROVISIONS OF THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT BE APPLICABLE TO RESPONDENT, THERE "\VAS A
TOTAL FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AS
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TO RESPONDENT, IN THAT APPELLANT
DID NOT PERFORl\tI HIS OBLIGATIONS TO
RESPONDENT.
I

THE. DEBT-ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT
vV AS NOT A COLLATERAL AGREEMENT
WHICH SURVIVED THE EXECUTION OF
THE EXCHANGE DEEDS.
The general rule of law in this area is clear and
has been recognized in several Utah decisions, among
them those cited by Appellants. Utah Savings & Trust
Co. v. Stoutt, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac. 865 (1909) ;Knight
v. Southern Pacific Co.,52 Utah 42,172 Pac. 689 (1918)
and Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142,158 Pac.
684 ( 1916). The latter case, quoting the general law
and recognizing the legitimate substitution of parties,
states at page 689:
"No rule of law is better settled than that,
where a deed has been executed and accepted as
performance of an executory contract to convey
real estate, the contract is functus officio, and
the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely
on the deed. This is so although the deed thus
accepted varies from that stipulated for in the
contract, as where the vendee accepts the deed
of a third party in lieu of the deed of his vendor;
"
See also Snider v. Marble, 168 Kan. 459, 213 P. 2d 984
(1950).
5

Indeed, the variation or inconsistency noted by the
Utah Court has been regarded as an important factor
in the interpretation of a final agreement as a recision
of the original agreement since it clearly indicates a
change from the original. The effect of such inconsistent later agreement has been recognized in Hughes
v. Helzer, 182 Ore. 205, 185 P. 2d 537 (1947), wherein
the Court said:
"The procuring of a new contract of sale covering tract C, the terms of which were inconsistent with and could not stand together with
those of the original contract ... may in itself
be regarded as a discharge or surrender of the
original contract." (Emphasis added).
See also 55 Am .J ur; Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 583
at page 977, wherein it states:
"As a general rule a contract for the sale of
land . . . will be considered as having been rescinded by a subsequent and inconsistent contract between the same parties concerning the
same subject matter, ... " (Emphasis added).
Appellants' citation in the annotation at 84 ALR
1041 reiterates this point and in speaking of agreements
to pay encumbrances which did not merge in a subsequent deed, the annotation goes on to qualify its language by stating a merger of a preliminary agreement
does not exist when the subsequent deed
" ... does not contain ... any stipulation inconsistent therewith ... ,, (Emphasis added)·
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In the instant case, the final agreement is inconsistent with the Earnest n-Ioney Agreement of September 23, 1963, in a basic element. The preliminary
agreement contemplated two buyers; in the final transaction, there was but one. The clear implication being
that the parties, subsequent to the initial agreement,
decided only one of the buyers would continue with the
transaction. The fact that the exchange deeds were
executed by and to this single buyer with the knowledge of all concerned is evidence of the conscious release of one buyer from both the benefit and the obligations of the preliminary agreement.
The three cases cited by Appellants in an attempt
to preserve the Respondent's assumption of the obligation beyond the final execution of the deeds are each
distinguishable from the present case in at least one
important factor.
In each of the cases, Linbrook Realty Corp. v.
Rogers, 158 Va. 181, 163 SE 346, 84 ALR 1035
(1932); Stockton v. Gould, 149 Pa. 69, 24 A. 160
( 1892) ; and Shockley v. Roelli, 188 Wis. 564, 206 NW
856 ( 1926), the ultimate vendee was not a party to the
preliminary agreement but was in fact a stranger both
to that agreement and to the vendor himself.
This is far from the situation in which, as here,
ultimate vendee was not only known to the vendor
was in fact a party to the original agreement and
final transaction was not a substitution of parties
simply the reduction from two buyers to one.
7
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The burden of proof rests on one who denies the
merger of a prior contract into a deed to show that a
merger was not intended, Smith v. Vehrs, 194 Ore.
492, 242 P. 2d 586 (1952). A merger was clearly
intended and accomplished and Appellant failed at
trial to meet the burden of his attack upon such merger.

II
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT
WAS, BY ITS OWN TERMS, ABROGATED
BY THE EXECUTION OF TIIE EXCHANGE
DEEDS.
The Earnest Money Agreement, at lines 34 and 35,
stated:
"It is further agreed that the execution of the
final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase."

By its very terms, this Agreement ceased to exist upon
execution of the exchange deeds and became thereafter
a nullity. The parties agreed in language that is clear
and unequivocal that once the final docuoments were
executed, with no restriction placed on the terms thereof, that the Earnest Money Agreement would thereafter be of no further force and effect. Those final
documents have been executed and by the clear intent
of the parties the Earnest Money Agreement with all
the rights and obligations set forth therein has terminated.
8
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\Vhile it is true the final documents differed to
some extent from the Earnest Money Agreement it
cannot be seriously argued that a final agreement may
not differ from a preliminary one for there can be no
question of the right or ability of the parties to amend
or modify any agreement. Such ability is identical with
that which permits the formation of an agreement in
the first instance.
An Earnest .Money Agreement, by its very nature,
is a preliminary, temporary agreement and, by its terms
and useage, contemplates and anticipates its own replacement, with the attendant opportunity for alteration or modification. The preliminary nature of this
Earnest Money Agreement is further evidenced in the
fact that its own terms contemplated at least one change,
a possible substitution of parties. The agreement uses
the phrase "to be arranged" in the blank for the
grantee's name. Appellant testified that he too completed the exchange in his own and his wife's name after
eliminating the joint interest of a third party in the
Kelsey property (Tr. 34-35), a move not unlike that
of Respondent and Mr. Hansen.
Even apart from the contractual language cited
above, it has been generally held that the performance
of any modified agreement indicates the intent of the
parties to accept the new and abandon the old. Nordf ors v. [(night, 90 Utah 114, 60 P. 2d lll5 (1936). In
the case before the Court, the Appellant did perform
under the modification as did Mr. Hansen, a clear
indication of their intent to rely on that modification.
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The Earnest Money Agreement of September 2a,
1963, by its own terms and by the intent and subsequent actions of the parties, was and is of no further
force and effect once the exchange deeds were executed
and delivered.

III
IF THE DEBT-ASSUJHPTION AGREE~IENT DID SURVIVE THE EXECUTION OF
THE EXCHANGE DEEDS, IT DID SO ONLY
AS TO THE VENDEE OF APPELLANTS'
PROPERTY.
The two deeds and the assignment of contract
executed as the final transaction in the subject exchange
were entirely in harmony and consistent with the Earnest Money Agreement in the matter of the obligations
and benefits falling upon C. Phil Hansen and under
these circumstances, if the obligations of that initial
agreement survived at all they can only be charged
to Mr. Hansen. No one would doubt his responsibility
for those obligations. Appellant seeks to impose those
obligations upon Respondent simply because there now
appears some doubt as to the solvency of Mr. Hansen.
Appellant was clearly willing to deal only with
Mr. Hansen in the final exchange as evidenced by the
fact that he knowlingly did so. Appellant's claim he
did not notice to whom he was transferring his property and did not read the deed proffered to him (Tr. 35)
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is belied by the fact that by his own testimony he is
a man of considerable experience in the real estate
field who pays attention to the documents he signs
(Tr. 35). To this must be added Respondent's testimony that he affirmatively notified Appellant of his,
Respondent's, withdrawal from the deal prior to the
closing. (Tr. 44-45).
The question of intent is, of course, controlling
in the interpretation of the rule of merger of documents,
Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Smith~ 41 N.IVI. 82, (H
P. 2d 377 ( 1936), and the intent here was clear both
from Respondent's testimony and the external facts
that the transaction be completed excluding Respondent from both its benefit and obligation.

IV
EVEN SHOULD THE DEBT-ASSUMPTION PROVISIONS OF THE EARNEST
MONEY AGREEMENT BE APPLICABLE
TO RESPONDENT, TJIERE WAS A TOTAL
FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION AS TO RESPONDENT, IN THAT APPELLANT DID
NOT PERFORM HIS OBLIGATIONS TO RESPONDENT.
The Earnest Money Agreement called simply for
an exchange of property with the buyers therein agreeing to assume payment for certain "extras" as an additional consideration for Appellant's conveyance to
11

them of the Kelsey property. Appellant did not and
has not conveyed that property to Respondent. Respondent has, therefore, not received that to which the
Agreement entitled him. Unless and until Appellant
performs his part of the bargain, there is a complete
failure of consideration as to Respondent. It is ax10matic that tq be enforceable a contract must be supported by a good and valuable consideration such as
was bargained for by the parties. Forgeron Incorporated v. Hansen, 149 Cal. App. 2d, 362, 308 P. 2d 406
(1957).

Appellant argues Respondent received "some
benefit" from the exchange when he relinquished his
interest in the Kelsey property under a separate arrangement with :Mr. Hansen and implies Respondent
would, therefore, be unjustly enriched if not forced to
perform under the Earnest lVloney Agreement. Whatever benefit, if any, Respondent received in his separate
dealing with Mr. Hansen was received in exchange
for relinquishing his right and interest to the Kelsey
property and, hence, there was a quid pro quo and he
cannot be said to have gained any form of improper
benefit.
But beyond this, whatever the negotiations between
l\ir. IIansen and Respondent, they were of no concern
to Appellant nor to this proceeding. Respondent, for
a reason he deemed adequate and with the knowledge
of Appellant, relir~quished his interest in the Kelsey
property to Mr. If ansen. Appellant then performed
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his part of the original bargain but only as far as Mr.
Hansen is concerned. That performance and the reciprocal performance of Mr. Hansen excluded Respondent entirely from any consideration under the
Agreement and precludes any attempt to now force
him to perform thereunder.

CONCLUSION
The Lower Court, after hearing all the evider:.ce
in this matter, properly held that Respondent was not
obligated under the Earnest J\1oney Agreement and
the dismissal of Appellant's Complaint as to Respondent should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON & BETTILYON
By W. W. Kirton, Jr.
Attorneys for Respondent
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